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SchedulingAbstract This study analyzes the cooperative coalition problem for formation scheduling based on
incomplete information. A multi-agent cooperative coalition framework is developed to optimize
the formation scheduling problem in a decentralized manner. The social class differentiation mech-
anism and role-assuming mechanism are incorporated into the framework, which, in turn, ensures
that the multi-agent system (MAS) evolves in the optimal direction. Moreover, a further differen-
tiation pressure can be achieved to help MAS escape from local optima. A Bayesian coalition nego-
tiation algorithm is constructed, within which the Harsanyi transformation is introduced to
transform the coalition problem based on incomplete information to the Bayesian-equivalent coali-
tion problem based on imperfect information. The simulation results suggest that the distribution of
agents’ expectations of other agents’ unknown information approximates to the true distribution
after a ﬁnite set of generations. The comparisons indicate that the MAS cooperative coalition algo-
rithm produces a signiﬁcantly better utility and possesses a more effective capability of escaping
from local optima than the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm and the Simulated Annealing
algorithm.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of CSAA & BUAA. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The continuous growth of air trafﬁc ﬂow has created an energy
and environmental crisis, which has aroused global concerns.According to the international airport association, the passen-
ger demand is expected to reach 9.1 billion and cargo demand
214 million tons in 2025, which in turn will result in 1.4 billion
tons of CO2 emissions,
1 increasing concerns for energy
demand and environment crisis. In 2009, the European Union
created its long-term vision on reducing CO2 emissions to half
of the 2005 level by 2050.2 The Chinese government has also
promised to reduce CO2 emissions to 45%–50% of the 2005
level by 2020. The aviation sector will inevitably be forced to
reduce its share of emissions. Formation ﬂight has been widely
recognized as one of the most promising coping strategies due
to its potential for reducing fuel use. NASA, Airbus, Boeing
Fig. 1 Representation of a formation path.
Fig. 2 WGSMT formation path.
1748 L. Meng et al.and other researchers have pioneered studies regarding aerody-
namic theory and the fuel economy of extended formation ﬂy-
ing in the commercial aviation sector.3–8
Formation scheduling problems have become the focus of
these studies. Scheduling is typically described as when, where
and with whom ﬂights are scheduled to join a formation, with
the objective being to minimize overall fuel costs. The forma-
tion ﬂight paths must be created in advance to evaluate the fuel
economy of a speciﬁc schedule. Therefore, the formation
scheduling and path planning problems are highly correlated
and solved simultaneously. The formation scheduling problem
is based on the recursive weighted geodesic steiner minimum
tree (WGSMT) constructing problem. However, because no
exact analytical solution of the WGSMT Steiner point prob-
lem exists,9 a numerical solution technique will cause the prob-
lem to become exponentially complex. Ribichini and Frazzoil
formulated the problem as three related sub-problems, pre-
sented a multi-agent coalition algorithm and solved it via the
greedy method.10 Bower et al. optimized the formation path
by using the Nelder–Mead Simplex algorithm.11 Kent and
Richards built a mixed integer programming model for
large-scale formation scheduling and solved it based on Simu-
lated Annealing.12 Later, they incorporated wind impacts into
the model.13 Recently, Xu et al. developed a bi-level formation
ﬂight path planning framework in which heterogeneous air-
craft drag models are involved. They also signiﬁcantly reduced
the problem’s complexity by restricting the search space inside
the intersections of all the candidate ﬂight performance and
fuel-efﬁciency envelopes.14,15 Xu et al. presented a mathemat-
ical model of the formation path planning problem along with
related geometric deductions.16
Previous research has mainly been conducted under the
assumption of complete information. The inherent complexity
of the problem, which is induced by geodesic measurements, is
seldom considered. In this paper, we focus on the interconti-
nental commercial formation scheduling problem based on
incomplete information. In Section 2, we give the problem
description and model it using a recursive WGSMT construc-
tion problem. An approximate analytical solution of the
WGSMT Steiner point problem is derived to reduce the prob-
lem’s complexity. In Section 3, a cooperative coalition frame-
work is developed to treat the problem in a decentralized
manner. We also propose a coalition negotiation algorithm
based on incomplete information. We then make comparisons
to verify the validity and efﬁciency of our algorithm. Finally,
we present our conclusions and suggestions for future work
in Section 5.
2. Mathematical formulation
2.1. Problem formulation
In our previous work, the formation ﬂight scheduling problem
was developed from the WGSMT construction problem, as
was a detailed description of the mathematical model.16 A for-
mation path includes departures, rendezvous points, break-
away points and arrivals, which are connected by geodesic
lines11 (Fig. 1). Based on the assumption that only two ﬂeets
are scheduled to join the formation at a rendezvous point
and separate from the formation at a breakaway point,12 the
degree of all rendezvous points and breakaway points isexactly 3. Therefore, the formation path can be represented
by a WGSMT tree, T(D,R,B,A,W), spanning the departure
set, D= {di|i= 1,2, . . .,m}, and the arrival set, A= {aj|
j= 1,2, . . .,n} (Fig. 2)12,16. The rendezvous point set, R=
{ri|i= 1,2 ,. . .,m  1}, and the breakaway point set, B= {bj|
i= 1,2, . . .,n  1}, are Steiner point sets. W is the arc weight
set, which is determined by ﬂeet size. The objective is to min-
imize the total weighted geodesic distance of T(D,R,B,A,W)
by optimizing the formation schedule.
Based on the topological features of the formation path, the
construction of T(D,R,B,A,W) can be redeﬁned as recursively
constructing T(k) = {(oi(k),gi(k),qi(k)), i2F(k)} until T(k) con-
verges. In T(k), oi(k) is i’s current position, gi(k) is i’s goal-
reachable position, qi(k) is i’s ﬂeet size, F(k) = {1,2, . . .,n
(k))} is the formation set and n(k) is the number of formations
at generation k.
To quantify the fuel economy of formation ﬂight, we intro-
duce the equivalent range as16
dffðoiðkÞ; giðkÞÞ ¼ wiðkÞdðoiðkÞ; giðkÞÞ ð1Þ
where d(oi(k),gi(k)) is the geodesic distance from oi(k) to gi(k);
wi(k) = 1/ei(qi(k)), ei(qi(k)) is the relative range deﬁned by the
ratio of the fuel mileage ﬂying in a formation relative to that
ﬂying solo;17 dff(oi(k),gi(k)) is the equivalent range from oi(k)
to gi(k) and ‘‘ff” represents ‘‘formation ﬂight”.
eiðqiðkÞÞ ¼ 2qiðkÞ=ðqiðkÞ þ 1Þ ð2Þ
At k= 0, T(k) = {fi(k) = (oi(k),gi(k),qi(k))|i= 1,2,. . .,n(k),
oi(k)2D, gi(k)2A, qi(k)2N}.
At k> 0, all possible 2-member formations in T(k) are
scheduled to minimize the overall equivalent range:
min f ¼
X
i;j2FðkÞ
dhi;jiðkÞ½qiðkÞðdffðoiðkÞ; rhi;jiðkÞÞ
þ dffðrhi;jiðkÞ; bhi;jiðkÞÞ þ dffðbhi;jiðkÞ; giðkÞÞÞ
þ qjðkÞðdffðojðkÞ; rhi;jiðkÞÞ þ dffðrhi;jiðkÞ; bhi;jiðkÞÞ
þ dffðbhi;jiðkÞ; gjðkÞÞÞ ð3Þ
where
dhi;jiðkÞ ¼
1 if formation hi; ji is formed
0 if formation hi; ji isn’t formed

ð4Þ
Fig. 3 Cooperative rule.
Cooperative coalition for formation ﬂight scheduling based on incomplete information 1749where rhi;jiðkÞ and bhi;jiðkÞ denote the rendezvous point and
breakaway point of formation hi, ji. For simplicity, only two
typical constraints are included in the model.
(1) Maximum allowed equivalent range. Any ﬂeet i’s equiv-
alent range from oi(k) to gi(k) in formation hi; ji shall not
be greater than the equivalent range from oi(k) to gi(k)
based directly on a solo ﬂight.
½dffðoiðkÞ; rhi;jiðkÞÞ þ dffðrhi;jiðkÞ; bhi;jiðkÞÞ
þ dffðbhi;jiðkÞ; giðkÞÞð1þ eiÞ 6 dffðoiðkÞ; giðkÞÞ;
8i 2 FðkÞ and dhi;jiðkÞ ¼ 1
ð5Þwhere 0 6 ei < 1 is the minimum expected utility factor
of ﬂight or ﬂeet i and it is not known to others. There-
fore the formation scheduling problem is based on
incomplete knowledge.Fig. 4 Semi-cooperative rule.(2) Maximum allowed formation size. Any ﬂeet’s size must
not be greater than the maximum allowable formation
size, qmax, ensuring that no unintentional formation
breakaway will occur due to cumulative tracking errors
due to possible turns.
qiðkÞ 6 qmax; 8i 2 FðkÞ ð6ÞOnce the scheduling matrix DðkÞ ¼ ½dhi;jiðkÞ is solved, T(k)
will be updated by T(k+ 1) via Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. WGSMT updating
Step 1. k= k+ 1, T(k) = { }.
Step 2. Update the current positions and goal-reachable positions
of all agents.For any dhi;jiðkÞ ¼ 1; i– j formation hi; ji is formed
ðohi;jiðkÞ; ghi;jiðkÞ; qhi;jiðkÞÞ ¼ ðrhi;jiðk 1Þ; bhi;jiðk 1Þ; qiðk
 1Þ þ qjðk 1ÞÞ ð7Þ
TðkÞ ¼ TðkÞ [ fððohi;jiðkÞ; ghi;jiðkÞ; qhi;jiðkÞg ð8Þ
For any dhi;jiðkÞ ¼ 0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; i 1; iþ 1; . . . nðkÞ, i has
not joined any formation at k,
ðoiðkÞ; giðkÞ; qiðkÞÞ ¼ ðoiðk 1Þ; giðk 1Þ; qiðk 1ÞÞ ð9Þ
TðkÞ ¼ TðkÞ [ fðoiðkÞ; giðkÞÞ; qiðkÞÞg ð10ÞFig. 5 WGSMT Steiner point of 3 non-collinear spherical
points.2.2. Formation scheduling rules
Two formation scheduling rules are considered in our
framework:
(1) Cooperative rule (Fig. 3). If i and j rendezvous into hi, ji
at rhi, ji (k) and breakaway from hi, ji at bhi, ji (k), where
rhi, ji (k) and bhi, ji (k) are the two WGSMT points of
{oi(k),oj(k),gi(k),gj(k)}, then the next position vector of
both i and j, [ohi, ji (k+ 1), ghi, ji (k+ 1)], should be
replaced by [rhi, ji (k), bhi, ji (k)]. The cooperative rule is
fair to both sides because the rendezvous and breakaway
points are determined by complete geometric rules. Each
side shares the utility corresponding to its ﬂeet size.(2) Semi-cooperative rule (Fig. 4). If j leave oj(k) for oi(k) to
join hi, ji and break away from hi, ji at point gi(k), then
the next position vector, [ohi, ji (k+ 1), ghi, ji (k+ 1)],
should be replaced by [oi(k),gi(k)]. In this case, i gains
more than it would via the cooperative rule while j gains
less than it would via the cooperative rule. This is
because i has no incentive to form a cooperative coali-
tion due to unsatisﬁed utility. However, i would not
reject a semi-cooperative rule because it gains more util-
ity than it would via the cooperative rule without
increasing any costs, compared to ﬂying solo, while j
may have no better choice than joining hi, ji at point
gi(k) because of its adverse position.
2.3. Approximate analytical solution of a WGSMT Steiner point
For any three non-collinear spherical point,
fAðuA; kAÞ;BðuB; kBÞ;CðuC; kCÞg, satisfying qA + qB = qC,
let SðuS; kSÞ be the WGSMT Steiner point (Fig. 5). The
WGSMT problem can be simpliﬁed into18
min f ¼ qAwAS_ dðA;SÞ þ qBwBS_ dðB;SÞ þ qCwCS_ dðC;SÞ ð11Þ
1750 L. Meng et al.Based on the K–T condition, we can obtain Eqs. (12) and
(13) where AS
_
;BS
_
, and CS
_
represent great circle in arc.tan kS ¼
qAwAS
_ cosuA sin kA
sinAS
_ þ
qBwBS
_ cosuB sin kB
sinBS
_ þ
qCwCS
_ cosuC sin kC
sinCS
_
qAwAS
_ cosuA cos kA
sinAS
_ þ
qBwBS
_ cosuB cos kB
sinBS
_ þ
qCwCS
_ cosuC cos kC
sinCS
_
ð12Þ
tanuS
sin kS
¼
qAwAS
_ sinuA
sinAS
_ þ
qBwBS
_ sinuB
sinBS
_ þ
qCwCS
_ sinuC
sinCS
_
qAwAS
_ cosuA sin kA
sinAS
_ þ
qBwBS
_ cosuB sin kB
sinBS
_ þ
qCwCS
_ cosuC sin kC
sinAS
_
ð13ÞNo exact analytical solutions exist for Eqs. (12) and (13).
However, because CS
_
>> AS
_
; BS
_
; 0 < AS
_
< p=2 < CS
_
þ
AS
_
< p and p=2 < BS
_
þAS
_
< p are always true in interconti-
nental aviation16, we then have approximation Eq. (14).
sinAS
_
 sinBS
_
 sinCS
_
ð14Þ
Eqs. (12) and (13) can be simpliﬁed into Eqs. (15) and (16).tan kS ¼ ðqA þ 1Þ cosuA sin kA þ ðqB þ 1Þ cosuB sin kB þ ðqA þ qB þ 1Þ cosuC sin kCðqA þ 1Þ cosuA cos kA þ ðqB þ 1Þ cosuB cos kB þ ðqA þ qB þ 1Þ cosuC cos kC
ð15Þ
tanuS
sin kS
¼ ðqA þ 1Þ sinuA þ ðqB þ 1Þ sinuB þ ðqA þ qB þ 1Þ sinuCðqA þ 1Þ cosuA sin kA þ ðqB þ 1Þ cosuB sin kB þ ðqA þ qB þ 1Þ cosuC sin kC
ð16ÞFor any four non-collinear spherical point set,
fAðuA; kAÞ;BðuB; kBÞ;CðuC; kCÞ;DðuD; kDÞg, and based ontan kAB ¼ ðqA þ 1Þ cosuA sin kA þ ðqB þ 1Þ cosuB sin kB þ ðqA þ qBðqA þ 1Þ cosuA cos kA þ ðqB þ 1Þ cosuB cos kB þ ðqA þ qB
tanuAB
sin kAB
¼ ðqA þ 1Þ sinuA þ ðqB þ 1Þ sinuB þ ðqA þ qðqA þ 1Þ cosuA sin kA þ ðqB þ 1Þ cosuB sin kB þ ðqA þ qB
tan kCD ¼ ðqC þ 1Þ cosuC sin kC þ ðqD þ 1Þ cosuD sin kD þ ðqC þ qDðqC þ 1Þ cosuC cos kC þ ðqD þ 1Þ cosuD cos kD þ ðqC þ qD
tanuCD
sin kCD
¼ ðqC þ 1Þ sinuC þ ðqD þ 1Þ sinuD þ ðqC þðqC þ 1Þ cosuC sin kC þ ðqD þ 1Þ cosuD sin kD þ ðqC þ qDthe assumption that ﬂights depart from A and B and land at
C and D, so that qA þ qB ¼ qC þ qD, we introduce an imagi-
nary point, PCDððuC þ uDÞ=2; ðkC þ kDÞ=2Þ, paired with Aand B. The approximate analytical solutions of WGSMT Stei-
ner point SAB of A, B and PCD can then be determined by Eqs.
(17) and (18).
The true SAB will fall on geodesic line S
max
AB S
min
AB
_
. Therefore,
the largest error induced by the PCD will not be greater than
0:1CD
_
. This can be derived from the Ptolemey theorem19
(Fig. 6).Similarly, the approximate analytical coordinates of SCD
can be calculated via Eqs. (19) and (20).þ 1Þ cos½ðuC þ uDÞ=2 sin½ðkC þ kDÞ=2
þ 1Þ cos½ðuC þ uDÞ=2 cos½ðkC þ kDÞ=2
ð17Þ
B þ 1Þ sin½ðuC þ uDÞ=2
þ 1Þ cos½ðuC þ uDÞ=2 sin½ðkC þ kDÞ=2
ð18Þ
þ 1Þ cos½ðuA þ uBÞ=2 sin½ðkA þ kBÞ=2
þ 1Þ cos½ðuA þ uBÞ=2 cos½ðkA þ kBÞ=2
ð19Þ
qD þ 1Þ sin½ðuA þ uBÞ=2
þ 1Þ cos½ðuA þ uBÞ=2 sin½ðkA þ kBÞ=2
ð20Þ
Fig. 6 Error bound of WGSMT Steiner point of 4 non-collinear
spherical points.
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3.1. A role-centered MAS cooperative coalition framework
TheMASprovides an efﬁcient framework for treating problems
with dynamic interactions in a decentralized fashion, due to its
outstanding capabilities in parallel anddistributed computing.20
In an open and dynamic environment, an agent has the evolu-
tionary capability to adapt its relationshipwith the environment
through continued interactions.21 A large number of local inter-
actions will form a role-centered hierarchical structure in social
networks.22–27 Vincent and Weesie believe that reputations and
social roles have strong impacts on social structure emergence.25
Jacques and Gutknecht further present a role-centered organi-
zation model, in which the concepts of group, role and depen-
dency are used to deﬁne the basic interactive framework
among agents.26 The proposal-engaged marriage model is a
MAS model that is directly related to formation ﬂight schedul-
ing.10 In the model, a commitment to form a formation is
deemed an engagement, while a request to join a formation is
a proposal. Each agent deliberates its negotiation based on the
greedy method and within a predeﬁned communication radius.
Directed by these philosophies, a cooperative coalition frame-
work, with the objective of forming a role-centered hierarchical
MAS structure that is faithful to the structure of formation path,
is developed to optimize formation schedules. The framework
and algorithm was inspired by the proposal-engaged marriage
algorithm, to which the social class differentiation and role-
assuming mechanisms were introduced.
In our framework, a formation in the framework is a coali-
tion. Coalition forming negotiations are always initiated by
powerful airlines with high social reputations, while those with
low social reputations have either the right to decide whether
to agree upon forming a cooperative coalition or to initiate a
negotiation to form a semi-cooperative coalition. The coalition
is recursively conducted until a maximum coalition size has
been reached, which can be due to capacity or unacceptable
utility bounds.28 The terminology used to describe our frame-
work is deﬁned as follows.
(1) Social classes: elite, everyman. The elite class has a high
social reputation. Its associated cooperative utility will
be optimistic for the majority of agents. The everyman
class has a low social reputation. Its associated cooper-
ative utility may not be very optimistic for the majorityof agents. At the beginning of each generation, agents
are differentiated into elites and everymen based on their
social reputations.
The social reputation is calculated by the agent’s ﬂeet size,
or resource, and the aspect ratio, which is deﬁned by the ratio
of its lateral deviation from the geometric center to its equiva-
lent range.
reputationiðkÞ ¼ qiðkÞ 1
dffðoiðkÞ; OðkÞÞ þ dffðgiðkÞ; GðkÞÞ
dffððoiðkÞ; giðkÞÞ
 
ð21Þ
where ð OðkÞ; GðkÞÞ denotes the geometric center of all agents
positions at generation k. A higher resource amount and lower
aspect ratio contribute to a better reputation and consequently
a higher social class. Agents are differentiated into elites and
everymen based on the following rule:
If the variation of an agent’s reputation from the average
reputation of all agents is not less than the standard variation
of all agents reputations timed by a generalization factor,
vðkÞ 2 ½1; 1, it will then be differentiated as elite. Otherwise,
it will be differentiated as everyman. The generalization fac-
tor is updated by vðkÞ ¼ vðk 1Þ  ldv, and dv 2 ð0; 1Þ is
the step size of vðkÞ, ensuring that a minimum amount of dif-
ferentiation pressure always exists among agents. l > 1 is the
regulator used to adjust the step size of the generalization
factor.
(2) Agent behavior: recruit, enlist, follow, accommodate.
Agents possess different authority levels corresponding
to their social classes. Agents of the same class are not
allowed to form a coalition. Therefore negotiations are
only conducted between elite and everyman. Elite has
the authority to recruit an everyman to form a coopera-
tive coalition, or to accommodate an everyman to form
a semi-cooperative coalition. Everyman has the author-
ity to enlist an elite to form a cooperative coalition, or to
follow an elite to form a semi-cooperative coalition.
(3) Agent roles: leader, cooperator, volunteer. In a coali-
tion, elite is assumed to be leader, while everyman is
cooperator in a cooperative coalition and volunteer in
a semi-cooperative coalition. When a coalition is formed
between two agents, their state vectors, i.e. position vec-
tors in formation scheduling problem, will be updated
based on the rules stated in Section 2.2.
We model an agent as i= (oi(k), gi(k), qi(k), ci(k)) with its
current position oi(k), goal-reachable position gi(k), resource
qi(k) and social class ci (k). A cooperative coalition is modeled
by hi, ji= (leader = i, cooperator = j, volunteer = null,
resource = qi(k) + qj(k)), while a semi-cooperative coalition
is modeled by hi, ji= (leader = i, cooperator = null, volun-
teer = j, resource = qi(k) + qj(k)). If we consider an agent, i,
ﬂying solo as a coalition hi, nulli= (leader = i, coopera-
tor = null, volunteer = null, resource = qi(k)), then we have
the uniformed description of a coalition. Let GROUP(k) be
the coalition set and AGT(k) be the agent set at generation
k. Our framework can be programmed using Algorithm 2.
1752 L. Meng et al.Algorithm 2. MAS cooperative coalition
Initializing. k= 0, AGT(0) = {i= 1,2,. . .,n(0))}, GROUP(0) =
{ }, i= (oi(0), gi(0), qi(0), ci(0)), where oi(0)2D, di(0)2A, and ci(0)
= 0.
Step 1. If all the agents have already updated their state vectors
(see Algorithm 1), execute,
k= k+1;
AGT(k) = GROUP(k  1) [ AGT(k  1);
GROUP(k) = { };
vðkÞ ¼ vðk 1Þ  ldv.
Step 2. AGT(k) is diﬀerentiated into an elite set, I(k), and an
everyman set, J(k), based on the social reputations of all the
agents.
Step 3. Coalition negotiations are conducted between agents from
I(k) and J(k) based on Algorithm 3.
Step 4. If a cooperative coalition, hi, ji, is formed, update the
coalition state vectors based on Algorithm 1 and execute,
AGT(k) = AGT(k)  i;
AGT(k) = AGT(k)  j;
GROUN(k) = GROUN(k) + (leader = i, cooperator = j,
volunteer = null, resource = qi(k) + qj(k)).
Otherwise, if a semi-cooperative coalition, hi, ji, is formed, update
the coalition state vectors based on Algorithm 1 and execute,
AGT(k) = AGT(k)  j;
GROUN(k) = GROUN(k) + (leader = i, cooperator = null,
volunteer = j, resource = qi(k)+qj(k)).
Step 5. If at least two agents are involved in the coalition process,
go to Step 1. Otherwise, terminate the coalition process.Class differentiation and role assuming mechanisms are
incorporated into our framework to assure that MAS evolves
in optimal directions, which are dominated by elites. A
dynamic decreasing generalization factor, vðkÞ, will cause
MAS to escape from local optima.
3.2. Formation coalition negotiations based on incomplete
information
Although cooperation utilities, which are calculated based on
common rules, make each individual’s utilities public informa-
tion, agents do not know if their proposals will be accepted by
their preferred partners. Therefore, the minimum utility each
agent will accept and the strategy each uses are private
beliefs.29 Thus, the formation coalition problem can be formu-
lated as a cooperative game based on incomplete information.
The Harsanyi transformation builds the fundamental frame-
work for playing games based on incomplete information.30–32
By using the Harsanyi transformation, the original game with
incomplete information can be transformed to the Bayesian-
equivalent game with imperfect information. The imperfect
information is expressed by the subjective conﬁdence level of
the opponent’s utility and strategy types, as based on each
player’s expectations.
Consider the formation coalition problem G:(I,J,E,P,X),
with m elites and n everymen, and where I= {i= 1, 2,. . .,m}
and J= {j= 1,2,. . .,n} each separately denotes the elite set
and the everyman set. E= [el, eh] is the range space of the min-
imum expected utility factors of all the agents. P= [0,1] is the
strategy type range space for all the agents, where 0 denotes
non-cooperative and 1 denotes cooperative. X= {cooperative,
semi-cooperative} is the formation scheduling rules spacedeﬁned in Section 2.2. An agent’s utility factor, e
hi;ji
i , in coali-
tion hi, ji is,
e
hi;ji
i ¼ ðcsoloi  uhi;jii Þ=csoloi ð22Þ
where u
hi;ji
i is i’s utility in coalition hi, ji and csoloi is i’s cost of
ﬂying solo. ei 2 E is i’s minimum expected utility factor and pi-
2P is i’s strategy type. A non-cooperative agent will always try
to maximize its own utility. A cooperative agent will attempt
to maximize the utilities of its partners on the premise that
its utility factor is not less than its minimum expected utility
factor. x 2 X= {cooperative, semi-cooperative} denotes the
rule of forming coalition hi, ji. Agent i’s utility function in
coalition hi, ji can be mathematically expressed as
u
hi;ji
i ¼ csoloi ðoi;giÞ ½csoloi ðoi; rhi;jiÞ þ chi;jii ðrhi;ji;bhi;jiÞ þ csoloi ðbhi;ji;giÞ
ð23Þ
where csoloi ðoi; giÞ is i’s cost from oi to gi ﬂying solo and
c
hi;ji
i ðrhi;ji; bhi;jiÞ is i’s cost from rhi;ji to bhi;ji in coalition hi, ji.
In the formation scheduling coalition problem, the utility
and strategy types of each agent are unknown to others. This
section attempts to transform G:(I,J,E,P,X) based on incom-
plete information into G*:(I,J,E*,P*,X) with imperfect infor-
mation via the Harsanyi transformation.30,31 The key to the
Harsanyi transformation is that each agent assigns and
updates its subjective probabilities of other agent’s unknown
parameters based on their individual expectations. When this
task is completed, agents can then assess their utilities in all
possible coalitions and deliberate their negotiation sets based
on a Bayesian approach. In our framework, agents believe that
other agents’ unknown information initially obeys a basic
probability distribution. Subsequently, the probability distri-
bution of the unknown information changes over time based
on observing the negotiation outcomes in each negotiation
round.
Let P ¼ ½pE; pPT ¼ ½ðple; phe Þ; ðpcp; pncp ÞT be the basic proba-
bility proﬁle for the minimum utility and strategy types of all
agents over E and P where ‘‘l” represents low, ‘‘h” represents
high, ‘‘c” represent cooperative and ‘‘nc” represents non-
cooperative. ple and p
h
e are the agents’ prior membership grades
of e, belonging to el and eh and satisfying ple þ phe ¼ 1. pcp and
pncp are the agents’ prior membership grades of p, being both
non-cooperative and cooperative and satisfying pncp þ pcp ¼ 1.
For any agent i, let the true proﬁle of its utility type be
pei ¼ ½pli; phi  and that of its strategy type be ppi ¼ ½pnci ; pci . Both
pei and p
p
i are unknown to other agents. To form a coalition, an
agent must predict the pei and p
p
i proﬁles of all other agents.
They must then use them to assess their own utilities in all pos-
sible coalitions based on their own expectation. For elite i 2 I,
let the unknown information vector set be Jji ¼ fðejji; pjjiÞ
jj2Jg, with the subjective probability matrix PJji¼f½pejji ;ppjji T
jj2Jg be i’s own expectations, where pejji ¼½pljji;phjji  and
ppjji ¼½pncjji ;pcjji . At k= 0, i has no knowledge beyond P. There-
fore, it believes that PJji¼P. In conjunction with the negotia-
tion process, agents will revise PJ|i by observing the
outcomes of each previous negotiation.
If i is rejected by j, there are two primitive independent
causes, A and B, contributing to the event, deemed a fail,
where
Cooperative coalition for formation ﬂight scheduling based on incomplete information 1753(1) A is interpreted as ‘‘the membership grade of j’s mini-
mum expected utility factor belonging to el is overesti-
mated by de and that belonging to e
h is underestimated
by de, with a conﬁdence level of p
e;fail
i ”.
(2) B is interpreted as ‘‘the membership grade of j’s strategy
type belonging to non-cooperative is underestimated by
dp and that belonging to cooperative is overestimated by
dp, with a conﬁdence level of p
p;fail
i ”.
Because fAB;A B; AB; A Bg constitutes a partition of the
complete causes set of a fail event, agent i can revise its expec-
tation of the probability distribution of j’s unknown informa-
tion using Eq. (24).
Pjji ¼ ½pejji þ ðde; deÞ; ppjji þ ðdp;dpÞTpe;faili pp;faili
þ ½pejji þ ðde; deÞ; ppjji Tpe;faili ð1 pp;faili Þ
þ ½pejji ; ppjji þ ðdp;dpÞTð1 pe;faili Þpp;faili
þ ½pejji ; ppjji Tð1 pe;faili Þð1 pp;faili Þ ð24Þ
If i receives a follow proposal from j, and j is not in i’s nego-
tiation set, there will be two primitive independent causes, C
and D, contributing to this event, deemed an omit, where:
(1) C is interpreted as ‘‘the membership grade of j’s mini-
mum expected utility factor belonging to el is underesti-
mated by de, and that belonging to e
h is overestimated
by de with a conﬁdence level of p
e;omit
i ”.
(2) D is interpreted as ‘‘the membership grade of j’s strategy
type belonging to non-cooperative is overestimated by
dp, and that belonging to cooperative is underestimated
by dp with a conﬁdence level of p
p;fail
i ”.
Because fCD;C D; CD; C Dg constitutes a partition of the
complete causes set of an omit event, agent i can revise its
expectation of the probability distribution of j’s unknown
information using Eq. (25).
Pjji ¼ ½pejji þ ðde;deÞ; ppjji þ ðdp; dpÞTpe;omiti pp;omiti
þ ½pejji þ ðde;deÞ; ppjji Tpe;omiti ð1 pp;omiti Þ
þ ½pejji ; ppjji þ ðdp; dpÞTð1 pe;omiti Þpp;omiti
þ ½pejji ; ppjji Tð1 pe;omiti Þð1 pp;omiti Þ ð25Þ
The original coalition problem, G, can now be transformed
into G*, within which each agent plays with a virtual agent of a
different class who conducts a lottery in accordance with its
expectation of the probability of j’s unknown information.31,32
In the G* coalition game, i calculates its negotiation set using
Bayesian rationality via the following rule:
If both e
hi;ji
i P ei and e
hi;ji
j P ejji hold, then j is i’s rational
negotiation partner.where ejji is j’s minimum expected utility
factor based on i’s expectation.
ejji ¼ pljjiel þ phjji eh ð26Þ
However, i does not know if j will accept the proposal
because it does not know exactly about j’s strategy type. In this
case, it will calculate its risk utility in coalition hi, ji based onits own strategy type and its expectation of j’s strategy type.
Agent i’s risk utility in coalition hi, ji can be formulated as
Eq. (27).
u
hi;ji
i ¼ pnci pcjji uhi;jii þ pci pncjji uhi;jij ð27Þ
Agent i selects the best partner by maximizing risk utility
u
hi;ji
i . The risk utility is not the real utility that agent i might
achieve in hi, ji. It is agent i’s risk philosophy toward the utility
it may achieve in hi, ji based on both i’s strategy type and i’s
expectation of j’s strategy type.
Algorithm 3. MAS coalition negotiation based on incomplete
information
For any agent i, independent of its social class,
Step 1. Calculate Ui ¼ fðuhi;jii ; uhi;jij ; riÞjj 2 Jg.
Step 2. Deliberate the rational negotiation set NSi , using Eq.
(28).
NSi ¼ fj ehi;jii P ei; ehi;jij P ejji; qi þ qj 6 qmax; j 2 J
 g ð28Þ
Concurrently, reply messages from all other agents are
monitored. If a message is received from j, and j is not included in
NSi , P

jji is revised based on the omit event.
Step 3. If NSi is not empty, deliberate to ﬁnd the best-ranking
partner j in its risk utility with agents in NSi using Eq. (29).
j ¼ max
j2NSi
fpnci pcjji uhi;jii þ pci pncjji uhi;jij g ð29Þ
Otherwise, go to Step 6.
Step 4. Send a recruit proposal to j if i is an elite, or a follow
proposal to j if i is an everyman.
Step 5. If rejected by j, revise Pjji based on the fail event.
Otherwise, the hi; ji coalition is formed. Both agents in hi; ji
assume their roles based on their social classes and the rules
involved in forming hi; ji. For example, if i’s class is elite, it
assumes a leader role, while j must be everyman and assumes the
cooperator role based on the cooperative rule or volunteer role
based on the semi-cooperative rule.
Step 6. If the resource capacity of a coalition cannot
accommodate additional agents, then quit the coalition and
denote itself as ‘‘quit”.4. Simulations and results
4.1. Data preparation
A set of 100 intercontinental Chinese ﬂights was selected to
verify the validity of the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm.
Comparisons were also made to prove the efﬁciency of our
framework against that of the proposal-engaged marriage
algorithm and the Simulated Annealing algorithm, which rep-
resent decentralized and centralized approaches. All ﬂights
were considered to be homogeneous in our simulation. The
minimum expected utility factor is assumed to be based on a
normal distribution, with le ¼ pleel þ phe eh ¼ 0:1 and re ¼
minfle  el; eh  leg to ensure that the minimum expected
utility factors of all agents are distributed between 0 and 0.2,
with a conﬁdence of 0.9974. Similarly, we assume that the
Table 1 Simulation parameters.
Parameter MAS
cooperative
coalition
algorithm
Proposal-
engaged
marriage
algorithm
Simulated
annealing
algorithm
qmax 10 10 10
½pe;faili ; pp;faili  ½0:7; 0:7 Not available Not available
½pe;omiti ; pp;omiti  ½0:3; 0:3 Not available Not available
½el; eh ½0; 0:2 ½0; 0:2 ½0; 0:2
PE ½0:5; 0:5 ½0:5; 0:5 ½0:5; 0:5
[Non-
cooperative,
cooperative]
½0; 1 ½0; 1 ½0; 1
PP ½0:5; 0:5 ½0:5; 0:5 ½0:5; 0:5
v0 0.5 Not available Not available
de 0.1 Not available Not available
dp 0.1 Not available Not available
dv 0.1 Not available Not available
Fig. 8 Agent classes and roles.
Fig. 9 Negotiation times and acceptance rate.
1754 L. Meng et al.strategy type also obeys the normal distribution with
lp ¼ pcp  0þ pncp  1 ¼ 0:5 and rp ¼ minfpc  lp; lp
pncg=3 ¼ 0:067. The uniform rejection sampling method33
was used to generate a series of normal random numbers rep-
resenting the minimum expected utility factors and strategies
of all the agents. These pseudo-random numbers were subse-
quently transformed into the utility factor and strategy proﬁles
based on the range spaces’ lower and upper boundaries. Other
simulation parameters can be seen in Table 1.
In the MAS cooperative coalition framework, an agent is
classiﬁed as elite or everyman based on its social reputation.
Rational negotiations are then based on individual expectations.
An agent chooses its best-ranking partner based on the strat-
egy types of both parties, resulting in negotiations. If a fail
or omit event occurs to the agent, it will revise its expectation
of the rival’s utility and strategy proﬁles. In the framework of
the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm, an agent greedily
chooses the best-ranking partners according to the basic distri-
bution of the utility and strategy types of all agents, as well as
its individual’s utility and strategy types. An agent does not
revise its expectation of a rival’s utility and strategy types,
and all the agents are impartially treated in the negotiation
process. In the framework of the SA algorithm, the manage-
ment agent optimizes all possible 2-member coalitions basedFig. 7 Formation ﬂight path based on MAS cooperative
coalition algorithm.
Fig. 10 Mean utility factor.on the basic distribution of the utility and strategy types of
all the agents, with the Metropolis rule in each generation.
An initial solution is chosen via the class differentiation mech-
anism, which ensures that the SA search process has appropri-
ate initial conditions.
Simulations were conducted using Matlab 7.8. Object ori-
ented techniques were utilized to realize each agent’s properties
and methods. Communications among agents were realized
through the event mechanisms.
Fig. 13 Agents’ expectations of other agents’ p belonging to pnc
(k= 59).
Cooperative coalition for formation ﬂight scheduling based on incomplete information 17554.2. Validity of MAS cooperative coalition algorithm
Utility, ﬂeet size, negotiation count, count of agents with dif-
ferent roles and classes and agents’ expectations of other
agents’ utility and strategy types were chosen as metrics to val-
idate the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm. The MAS sys-
tem converged at the 59th generation. Thirty-six formations
were formed and a total utility of 112,619 nautical miles were
achieved for 100 ﬂights. Fig. 7 shows the resolved formation
ﬂight paths optimized via the MAS cooperative coalition algo-
rithm. Red arcs represent formation segments, blue arcs repre-
sent rendezvous segments and breakaway segments and green
arcs represent solo ﬂight paths.
Fig. 8 indicates that the elite count increases with k, while
the everyman count decreases with k. This is because the differ-
entiation pressure increases as the generalization factor
decreases, which helps MAS escape from the local optima.
The global optimization capability of the MAS cooperative
coalition algorithm is illustrated in Figs. 9 and 10. The ﬁrst
partial optimal solution was encountered at generation 3 and
the solution escaped from the ﬁrst local optima at generation
8. The process ﬂuctuates until it ﬁnally converges at generation
59.Fig. 11 Agents’ expectations of other agents’ e belonging to el
(k= 59).
Fig. 12 Agents’ expectations of other agents’ e belonging to eh
(k= 59).
Fig. 14 Agents’ expectations of other agents’p belonging to pc
(k= 59).Fig. 9 also shows that negotiation times decrease with k,
while the acceptance rate of forming coalitions increases with
k. A reasonable coalition forming acceptance rate can be
achieved in our framework, although ﬂuctuations may be pre-
sent. The lowest acceptance rate is not less than 33%, and rates
as high as 100% are achieved at times. This suggests that a
high-precision evaluation of other agents’ utility and strategy
types were achieved during the MAS evolutionary process.
Fig. 10 indicates that the lowest mean utility factor is not
less than 0.1, while the highest mean utility factor is not larger
than 0.5. This is because the relative range, as deﬁned by Eq.
(2), yields the largest utility factor of 0.5. Fig. 10 also indicates
that the mean utility factor keeps varying in accordance with
the mean utility early in the model, but sharply separates after
generation 40. This is because the utility factor that a forma-
tion could gain is determined by (q(k) + 1)/2q(k)  (q(k  1)
+ 1)/2q(k  1) and will inevitably converge to zero. However,
the absolute utility will improve as formation size increases.
Figs. 11–14 show the distributions of agents’ true utility
and strategy types, as well as the distribution of agents’
expectations of other agents’ utility and strategy types. The
Fig. 15 Comparison of mean formation size.
Fig. 16 Comparison of mean utility factor.
Fig. 17 Comparison of mean aircraft utility.
Fig. 18 Comparison of total ﬂeet utility.
1756 L. Meng et al.color-coded marks on the back-diagonal lines of each graph
represent agents’ true utility and strategy types. The color
spectrums in these ﬁgures illustrate the values of the color-
coded marks. The off-diagonal marks represent agents’ Baye-
sian estimations of other agents’ utility and strategy types.
The color intensity difference between an off-diagonal mark
and a back-diagonal mark illustrates the agent’s Bayesian esti-
mation error. A high level of similarity of the color between
off-diagonal marks and back-diagonal marks in Figs. 11–14
indicate the preferred approximation of Bayesian evaluation.
They also explain the higher coalition formation rate, as seen
in Fig. 9.
4.3. Comparison and discussion
Comparisons are based on the mean formation size, mean util-
ity factor, mean aircraft utility of and total ﬂeet utility in for-
mation to verify the advantages of the MAS cooperative
coalition algorithm in solving formation scheduling problems
based on incomplete information. The results were then com-
pared to those from the proposal-engaged marriage and Simu-
lated Annealing algorithms. Figs. 15–18 indicate that the MAS
cooperative algorithm yields more effective capability of escap-
ing from local optima than the proposal-engaged marriage and
Simulated Annealing algorithms. The MAS cooperative algo-
rithm converges at generation 59, while the proposal-engaged
marriage algorithm converges at generation 2 and Simulated
Annealing algorithm converges at generation 1. The total util-
ities of the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm, the proposal-
engaged marriage algorithm and the Simulated Annealing
algorithm are 112,619NM, 33078.15NM and 93731.89NM
respectively. Therefore, the improvements of 240.46% and
20.15% were achieved using our framework.5. Conclusions and future work
A MAS cooperative coalition framework was developed to
optimize the formation scheduling problem in a decentralized
manner. The social class differentiation and role-assuming
mechanisms were introduced into the framework to differenti-
ate agents into elites and everymen, corresponding to their
social reputations. The social class differentiation mechanism
assures that MAS evolves in the optimal direction. Moreover,
the social class differentiation mechanism helps the MAS to
escape from local optima.
A coalition negotiation algorithm was constructed to ana-
lyze the cooperative coalition problem based on incomplete
information. The Harsanyi transformation was introduced to
transform the coalition problem with incomplete information
to the Bayesian-equivalent coalition problem with imperfect
information. Each agent can improve its expectation of rival’s
utility and strategy types.
Our example shows that agents’ expectations of the
unknown information distribution of other agents will approx-
imate to the true distribution after a ﬁnite set of generations.
Our comparisons indicate that a signiﬁcantly better utility
can be achieved using the MAS cooperative coalition algo-
rithm, compared to using the proposal-engaged marriage and
Simulated Annealing algorithms. The comparison also shows
that the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm possesses a
more effective capability of escaping from local optima.
Cooperative coalition for formation ﬂight scheduling based on incomplete information 1757This study creates a basic framework for solving commer-
cial formation scheduling problems with incomplete informa-
tion. However, uncertainties related to aerodynamic coupling
and heterogeneous aircraft performance are not considered
in this study. These are highly complex issues and will be stud-
ied in future research.Acknowledgments
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